CRIMINOLOGY: DISCIPLINE OR INTERDISCIPLINE?

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ABSTRACT

In its modern form Criminology has had over one hundred years to assume a truly interdisciplinary nature, yet the dominant approach remains discipline-based. However, as the field of Criminology has evolved, the dominant discipline has shifted from medicine and psychology to sociology. The general rejection by sociologists of contributions from other fields seems based not only on normal disciplinary chauvinism, but also on a strongly held normative view that social conditions are more responsible for crime than innate individual differences.

Introduction

The Disciplinary Contributions

A cursory overview of the field of criminology would almost certainly lead to the conclusion that it is solidly interdisciplinary. First, the journal of its leading professional association, the American Society of Criminology, is entitled, Criminology. An Interdisciplinary Journal. Second, the contributors to the field do indeed include people with backgrounds in sociology, psychology, law, political science, economics, medicine, genetics, nutrition, anthropology and history, and they publish hundreds of criminologically oriented articles each year in various "interdisciplinary" journals (others include the Journal of Criminal Justice and Justice Quarterly) as well as in journals of their own disciplines. And third, there is a substantial number of books whose titles demonstrate the diverse array of disciplines that contribute to the field. These books include: Criminal Behavior: A Psychosocial Approach (Bartol 1980), The Economics of Crime (Andreano and Siegfried, 1980), The Sociology of Crime and Delinquency (Wolfgang, Savitz and Johnston, 1970), The Political Science of Criminal Justice (Nagel, Fairchild and Champagne, 1983), Psychology and Criminal Justice (Ellison and Buckhout,
But if one expects, as does Klein (1986:409) that "all interdisciplinary work is rooted in a fundamental epistemology of convergence, an integrative synthesis" that produces various kinds of disciplinary interaction, criminology is not very interdisciplinary. Instead of convergence and integrative synthesis, there are different schools of criminology according to Buickhuisen (1979) – e.g., the sociological, the psychological, the biological, and the economic – each going its separate way. He points out (1979:27) "The common factor in each of these schools is that they look at the crime problem in a unidisciplinary way (italics added).

The remaining portion of this introductory section will be devoted to illustrating that unidisciplinarity in criminology, and pointing out that the phenomenon of disciplinary bias is all too common in various fields that, like criminology, seem to clamor for interdisciplinary approaches. Then, the main thrust of this presentation will be directed toward arguing, in terms of historical development as well as current attitudinal structures, that the prospects for interdisciplinarity in the visible future are not great. In short, the argument will be to the effect that the intellectual heart of criminology is dominated by a single discipline which has shown little proclivity toward incorporating, or even countenancing, other disciplinary perspectives.

**The Schools of Criminology**

The segmentation in criminology described by Buickhuisen (1979) may be illustrated, first, by reference to that microcosm of a field, the introductory text. A typical text in criminology or juvenile delinquency will have separate chapters devoted, on the one hand, to psychological, psychiatric, or "individualistic" theories, and, on the other hand, to sociological theories. There may be mention of economic theory, but that will be in a few separate paragraphs, perhaps as a component of an historical introduction to theorizing. For example, in her leading introductory book in criminology, Reid (1985) has a chapter entitled, "Biological and Psychological Theories" and two others entitled "Sociological Theories of Criminal Behavior." Economic theory is discussed very briefly under the heading "Moder Punishment Philosophy" in the chapter "Early Explanations of Criminal Behavior and Their Modern Counterparts." Similarly, in his text on juvenile delinquency, Empey (1982) has a chapter entitled, "Control Theory: Biological and Psychodynamic," and four chapters devoted to sociological theories under the titles "Cultural Deviance Theory," "Symbolic Interactionist Theory," "Strain Theory,"
and "Social Control Theory." There is no reference to economists or to economic theories in the book's index.

A book entitled *Theoretical Criminology* (Vold and Bernard, 1986) shows that compartmentalization rather than integration of perspectives is not an idiosyncrasy of introductory texts. To indicate the representativeness and importance of that book, it is now in its third edition and was written originally in 1958 by a man of distinction in criminology (Vold). While it contains an expression of interest in convergence of theories, in integration of perspectives in the concluding statement (1986:363), "The challenge for criminologists is to construct ... unified theories of crime," the actual presentation shows full disciplinary separation. Psychology enters in the chapter "Theories Related to Intelligence," psychiatry in "The Personality of the Offender," biology in "Biological Factors and Criminal Behavior," economics in "Crime, Poverty, and Economic Inequality," and sociology in eight chapters that range from "Durkheim, Anomie, and Modernization" to "Conflict Criminology" and "Marxist Criminology."

**The Generality of the Problem**

In his plea for a spirit of interdisciplinarity among criminologists, Jeffery (1978:50) illustrates one reason for the compartmentalization rather than integration of disciplinary viewpoints in criminology as follows:

> While I was still a graduate student [with sociology as the major field], I asked myself how it was possible to have three giants such as Sutherland [sociology], Hall [law], and Skinner [psychology] within 100 yards of each other [at Indiana University] without any significant mutual interaction. They might as well have been on different planets, so far as graduate education in criminology was concerned at Indiana.

That phenomenon at Indiana is of course a local manifestation of the "ethnocentrism of disciplines:" to which Campbell (1969:328) referred as the major obstacle to his formula for achieving greater interdisciplinarity among the social sciences. The ethnocentrism, according to Campbell (1969:328), constitutes "the symptoms of tribalism or nationalism or ingroup partisanship in the internal and external relations of university departments, national scientific organizations, and academic disciplines."

The depth of disciplinary ethnocentrism is well illustrated by the report of Vodopivec (1979) on the operations of the representatives of several disciplines who worked as members of teams on practical problems in criminology. The teams to which he referred included physicians, psychologists, sociologists, social
workers, statisticians, and educators working on projects for the institute of criminology associated with the Ljubljana (Yugoslavia) University Law School. In his words (1979:23), "The products of such cooperation have often remained compilations of individual, independent, and – to the rest of the study – unrelated monographs." To illustrate that independence, he described the team-related behavior of one participant as follows (1979:24): "throughout his ten-year association with the institute he has remained a psychologist, not a criminologist."

That type of disciplinary focus when one hopes for interdisciplinarity has been reported by others in fields far removed from criminology. For example Bella and Williamson (1976-77) discussed a similar phenomenon in the area of estuary engineering. They argued (1976-77:110) on behalf of interdisciplinarity: "Interdisciplinary environmental research ... can provide unique opportunities for innovation," and "Understandings of systems and problems may occur with an interdisciplinary focus which are more than a collection of disciplinary results." But, alas, they found that, typically, environmental (1976-77:121) "interdisciplinary research efforts rapidly decompose into loosely related disciplinary studies." They did suggest ways of minimizing those tendencies.

Discussions of the sources of those types of difficulties in interdisciplinary research are presented throughout the book edited by Chubin, Porter, Rossini, and Connolly (1981). In several chapters, too, the authors provide suggestions for management and operational strategies aimed at overcoming non-productive disciplinary tendencies in collaborative research.

There would seem little point in belaboring the general issue of disciplinary obstacles to interdisciplinarity since others, most particularly Campbell (1969) and Klein (1983), have summarized the issues so intelligently and comprehensively. Despite her listing of the various impediments to the achievement of interdisciplinarity, Klein (1983) seems generally optimistic about future possibilities through slow and painstaking efforts. She illustrates paths of success toward interdisciplinarity in the areas of immunopharmacology, written discourse, and oral testimony.

In contrast, it is difficult to be optimistic that criminology will achieve a substantial degree of interdisciplinarity in the foreseeable future, meaning something of the order of a "fundamental epistemology of convergence" or "an integrative synthesis." It has not achieved that status in the more than 100 years since, according to Mannheim (1972:1), the word "criminology" was introduced by the anthropologist Topinard, and there are few forces in evidence at the present time to change matters. That pessimism, it should perhaps be pointed out, refers to the field of criminology as a whole, and is not meant to denigrate the significant pockets of interdisciplinarity nor the efforts of a few spokesmen and spokeswomen
toward furthering the interdisciplinary perspective within criminology. The plea of Jeffery (1978) in that direction was mentioned above. Moreover, the edited book by Mednick and Shoham (1979) presents an interesting collection of interdisciplinary (as well as intercultural) efforts and enterprises. Additional people and projects that have similar foci will be presented later in this article.

In passing, it is perhaps of interest to note, first, that of the 13 contributors to Mednick and Shoham, only two are Americans -- one of them being Mednick, and, second, that Mednick's major interdisciplinary work was conducted in Denmark (see, for example, the several articles by Mednick and his co-workers in Mednick and Christiansen, 1977).

Let us now turn to consideration of factors in the development and present status of criminology that create pessimism in regard to the achievement of substantial interdisciplinarity in criminology.

**EARLY DEVELOPMENTS**

**The Laws that Define Criminal Behavior**

There have been legal codes for at least four thousand years that specify the nature of criminal acts and the punishments that are possible for violations of their provisions. For example, the Code of Hammurabi, dating from 2270 B.C., contains provisions to guide the behavior of the Babylonians, as, for example, (from Kocourek and Wigmore, 1915:327-442): "If a man steal an ox, or sheep, or ass, or pig, or boat from a temple or palace, he shall pay thirty-fold; if it be from a freeman he shall pay tenfold. If the thief has nothing with which to pay, he shall be put to death."

Assuming that the human condition has not changed drastically since the days of the Code of Hammurabi, there were people over four thousand years ago who violated its provisions and were accordingly punished. Moreover, under the same assumption, there were people who repeatedly violated code provisions that did not result in capital punishment. The violations, particularly the repetitive violations, very likely led to popular conjectures as to the characteristics of people or conditions of enforcement that caused the violational behavior. These sets of conjectures might be considered the primitive forerunner of criminology.

Subsequently, there were such statements of laws and related punishments as the Mosaic Code (Old Testament), the XII Tables (which Diamond, 1951:76, refers to as the "fountain-head of the Roman Law"), the Corpus Juris of Justinian (see Buckland, 1963), the Anglo-Saxon codifications that included the
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Laws of Aethelberht (about 600 A.D.), the Laws of Ine (about 700 A.D.), and the Laws of Aethelstan (about 900 A.D.). Discussions of these, and other codifications of the Anglo-Saxon era may be found in Seebohm (1911), Locourek and Wigmore (1915), and Diamond (1951).

The end of the Anglo-Saxon era in 1066 brought no major change in legal continuity, although the Normans did introduce "precise and orderly methods into the government and law of England" (Plucknett, 1956:11). That precision and orderliness, together with the centralization of authority under the Normans, were major factors in the growth of the common law of England (see Maitland, 1961). The common law was non-codified law that was based on the precedent set by earlier court decisions; its effectiveness depended upon systematic record keeping and uniformity across courts. In 1765, Sir William Blackstone published the first edition of his Commentaries on the Laws of England which contained a systematic, comprehensive presentation of the common law of the era. Volume IV of the Commentaries (reprinted in 1962 by the Beacon Press) is a textbook of English law dealing with criminal matters. In his introduction to the reprint, Kerr (Blackstone, 1962:xxvii) comments, "Blackstone's great achievement lies in his reducing to lucid and systematic treatment the disordered bulk of laws accumulated over the centuries.... They are a starting point for understanding the common law."

The attitude toward criminal behavior through the eighteenth century may be illustrated by the punishments prescribed for larceny. In the words of Blackstone (1962:274), "For though the inferior species of theft, or petit larceny, was only punished by imprisonment or whipping at common law, yet the punishment for grand larceny, or the stealing above the value of twelvepence ... was at common law regularly death." Because of the harshness of punishments, the decisions of many juries were for acquittal even when the evidence strongly indicated guilt. According to Kiralfy (1962:365), "The dislike of sending a man to his death led to illogical distinctions between various types of articles, e.g. a pet dog was considered not a subject of larceny, as it was hardly decent that a man should hang for a dog."

The Classical School of Criminology

That was the general scene of criminal law and its sanctions when the pioneer in criminology, Jeremy Bentham, started writing his many books. The first edition of perhaps the most important of these, The Principles of Morals and Legislation, appeared in 1789. (See a reprint of the work as Bentham, 1948). He was an attorney who espoused the utilitarian school of criminology (which is, at the present time, mostly referred to as the classical school), as did Beccaria (1963, originally published 1764) in Italy. To utilitarians, criminal behavior results from a rational choice that is the outcome of a balancing between anticipated pleasures
and possible pains, it is the task of society, from the perspective of the utilitarians, to provide punishment for criminal misbehavior such that the resulting pain exceeds possible gains. A decision to commit a crime, thus, becomes irrational when the punishment is sufficiently harsh and certain.

The Bentham-Beccaria perspective – that is, the classical school – did not have significant influence on what eventually became the field of criminology, but it has remained implicit in the thinking that guides laws and operations of the criminal justice system. In the words of Wilson (1985:51), "the policy analyst is led to assume that the criminal acts as if crime were the product of a free choice among competing opportunities and constraints. The radical individualism of Bentham and Beccaria may be scientifically questionable but prudentially necessary." Moreover, that utilitarianism is not entirely dead in current scientific criminology is indicated by Cusson's (1983) recent publication of what he calls strategic analysis. In that monograph, juvenile delinquency is accounted for in terms of rational decision-making involving evaluation of the advantages and disadvantages that particular behavior will elicit.

The Psychiatric Perspective and Positivism

Another criminological perspective became conspicuous during the latter part of Bentham's writing era, that of the physician-psychiatrists: Esquirol (1845), who distinguished between mental disease and mental defect and referred to criminal acts resulting from impulsive mania, Morel (1857), who used the concept of degeneracy in explaining criminal behavior and then described degenerate human types in terms of anatomical features, Prichard (1835), who introduced the phrase "moral insanity" to describe a decline in moral sensitivities, and Ray (1838) who described various criminal acts, as, for example, kleptomania and certain types of homicide in terms of moral insanity, and argued that an individual may be irresistibly impelled toward a crime. In addition, Wolfgang (1972:242) points out, "That a variety of pathological human types exists is clearly pronounced by Morel in his small monograph On the Formation of Types, published in 1864 and which contains many of the ideas developed by criminal anthropologists. It was Morel who suggested that the new science of human pathology be called 'morbid anthropology.'" The overall perspective was expanded later in the nineteenth century when Maudsley (1867,1870) described both insanity and crime in terms of degeneracy, but allowed contributions from environmental circumstances and such psychological factors as overwork and over-exertion.

That was the principal path of physician-psychiatrist thought that led to the ultimate bio-constitutional position of Lombroso in 1876. Lombroso's first writings, and the theory with which he remains most identified, set forth the theory that crime is caused almost fully by the degenerate characteristics of the criminal. He referred
to criminals as primitive ("atavistic") forms of human being with such distinctive facial, cephalic, and bodily anomalies as retreating forehead, small skull, voluminous ears, and broad cheekbones. They are born criminals, a distinct anthropological type, who are differentiable, not only from honest people but from a much smaller group of criminals who commit crimes for such reasons as passion, epilepsy, impulsivity or insanity. Throughout his discussions of born criminals and their characteristics, it is clear that as influential in Lombroso's thinking as the chain of psychiatric writings that led from crime as mental aberration to criminal as degenerate was the evolutionary theory of Darwin that became widely available in 1859 (On the Origin of Species) and 1871 (The Descent of Man).

While much of Lombroso's work in criminal anthropology has been resoundingly condemned, mostly, but not always, for good reasons (see Wolfgang, 1972), his bio-constitutional emphasis has been carried into the modern era through Hooton (1939), Sheldon (1949), and the Gluecks (1950, 1956), to Cortes and Gatti (1972) and Eysenck (1976, 1977) of this era. Goring's The English Convict, published in 1913, is generally regarded as the principal refutation of Lombroso's positions. Other strong criticisms may be found in Tarde (1912), Lindesmith and Levin (1937), and Gould (1981).

Two incidental points, related to the preceding discussion, are of importance in understanding the cross-currents of criminology in the 1980's. First, the contrasting viewpoints of the classical (utilitarian) school and the psychiatric tradition are based, respectively, on the differing philosophical conceptions of the ultimate source of human behavior: free will versus determinism. (See Ayer, 1982, for a discussion of the issues in the context of philosophy and Wilson, 1985, for their relevance to criminology.) And, second, the deterministic position of Lombroso was anchored in his conception of the priority of science and the importance of using the procedures, methodologies and modes of drawing inferences of the nineteenth century's scientific revolution. Wolfgang (1972:271) provides the following overview of that conception:

In sum, Lombroso investigated the etiology of crime with procedures in which he had been trained and felt competent. He used clinical and historical methods, anthropometric and statistical techniques, the tools of analogy and anecdotal illustration. His ill-defined measurements, unwarranted deductions and inadequate control groups constitute serious deficiencies of his research. But he also manifested imaginative insight, good intuitive judgment, intellectual honesty, awareness of some of his limitations, attempts to use control groups, and a desire to have his theories tested impartially.
The view that criminal behavior is determined by personal characteristics beyond the control of an individual, together with emphasis on science and the scientific method, were the prime factors in defining what became the positivist school of criminology. (See Mannheim, 1972, for an interesting discussion of the relationships and contrasts between the positivism of Comte, the founder of the movement generally, and positivism in criminology.) The founding of the positivist school is generally attributed to Lombroso and his two colleagues, Garofalo (1914) and Ferri (1917). That attribution, it should be emphasized, comes from Lombroso’s attitude toward determinism and the scientific method and not from the contents of his theory. (See Lindesmith and Levin, 1937, for a minority position arguing against regarding Lombroso and his entourage as the founders of positivism in criminology.) While the theoretical contributions of Lombroso have not had much influence on criminological thought over the years (indeed, they are mostly the objects of scorn), it is worth pointing out that in his later work Lombroso allowed environmental and social factors a considerable role in the etiology of criminal behavior, although they never achieved the import of biological factors for him. To illustrate, a book by Lombroso published in 1911 (reprinted 1968), was devoted principally to the social and environmental causes of crime. We find, for example, (1968:59), crime appears only when a certain density of population has been reached" and (1968:137), "the economic factor has a great influence upon crime."

**The Sociological Tradition**

Shortly after the first comprehensive national statistics became available in France in 1827, Guerry (1833), a French lawyer, published an analysis of crime rates as related to social factors. To illustrate the nature of his contributions, on the basis of assessing crime rates in wealthy and poor regions of France, he concluded that poverty does not cause property crime. Similar analyses were undertaken by Quetelet (1842), a Belgian mathematician, during the same era under the name "social physics," although De Quiros (1967:10) has called him "the first social criminologist." The work of Guerry and Quetelet, referred to as "moral statistics" by Guerry, continued over subsequent years as annual crime data became available and led to the conclusion that crime in general and crime in its various manifestations were regular and relatively constant features of society, although there could be local exacerbations on the basis of opportunity or readily apparent discrepancies between wealth and poverty.

The approach to the use of statistical data initiated by Guerry and Quetelet was used by Durkheim (1951, originally published 1897) in his study of suicide. And like those moral statisticians, he was convinced that crime was a regular phenomenon or social fact in society. But he went even further in insisting that crime is normal, playing a necessary role in social life. He indeed argued
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(1965a:72), "Crime, for its part, must no longer be conceived as an evil that
cannot be too much suppressed. There is no occasion for self-congratulation
when the crime rate drops noticeably below the average level, for we may be
certain that this apparent progress is associated with some social disorder."

In 1893, Durkheim (1965b) introduced the concept of "anomie," representing
probably his most fundamental and certainly his most longlasting contribution to
criminology. (This work had originally been Durkheim's doctoral dissertation which
led to the first doctor's degree in sociology from the University of Paris.) Behavioral
restraint to Durkheim came from an inner force for conformity (conscience) that was
reinforced by such social forces as respect, fear and concern for approval. Certain
changes in society, such as the development of large cities, produce a relaxation
of these forces and a degree of disorder or social chaos with an end result of
normlessness, the breakdown of cohesiveness, or anomie. The absence of
sources of restraint, in tum, leads to crime and similar anti-social behavior.

Other contributors to the sociological tradition during this early period were
Mayhew (see Quennel, 1950) who described crime in terms of conformity in his
exploration of London's underworld in the nineteenth century, Tarde (1912) who
concluded that the social environment -- rather than biology or genetics -- was
the most significant determiner of criminal behavior, and Bonger (1916) who
analyzed crime characteristics in capitalist society from a Marxist viewpoint.

The work of Lombroso and his colleagues, Garofalo and Ferri, so dominated
criminological thought during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries that
sociological criminology was virtually obliterated. The words of Lindesmith and Levin
(1937:661, 669) are particularly condemnatory of the process: "What Lombroso did
was to reverse the method of explanation that had been current since the time of
Guerry and Quetelet and, instead of maintaining that institutions and traditions
determined the nature of the criminal, he held that the nature of the criminal
determined the character of institutions and traditions," and "The Lombrosian myth
arose ... as a result of the 'seizure of power,' so to speak, by the medical
profession." Similarly, Morris (1957:41) remarked, "The founding of a school of
'criminal anthropology' seems to have resulted in the total or near total eclipse of
the work of sociologists in the criminological field." Taylor, Walton and Young
(1973:40), like Radzinowicz (1966), explain the rout on ideological grounds as follows:
"Biological determinism, then, has a greater appeal than sociological
positivism in that it removes any suggestion that crime may be the result of social
inequalities. It is something essential in the nature of the criminal and not a
malfunctioning in society." Other perspectives on the general issue may be found
in Kurella (1910), Sellin (1937), Wolfgang (1972), and Mannheim (1972).
THE MODERN ERA: PRINCIPALLY IN THE UNITED STATES

The Start of the Twentieth Century and Dominance of Individualism

Psychology and psychiatry took dominant positions in the United States early in this century on the basis of two developments: the intelligence testing movement and the initiation of a separate court system for juvenile offenders in 1899 (see Binder, 1979; Binder, 1987). Binet and Simon introduced the first standard instrument for the measurement of intelligence in 1905, and a markedly revised version in 1908 (see Goodenough, 1949 and Wolf, 1973). The scales and articles of Binet and Simon were translated into English and popularized by Goddard in conjunction with his work at the New Jersey Training School for the Feeble Minded. Then, Terman (1916) revised the Binet-Simon scale and standardized the revision on a sample of American children, producing the best known and most widely used intelligence test, the Stanford-Binet. It was in the Stanford-Binet that the concept intelligence quotient (IQ) was first used in reporting the results of intelligence testing; IQ was the ratio of mental age (the score used on Binet-Simon scales) to chronological age. There was a frenzy of activity with the newly available scales; the tests were given to prisoners, residents of jails and juvenile custodial facilities, hospitalized patients and many others. On the basis of a pattern of results over the studies, where the percentage of criminals evaluated as feebleminded ranged from 28 to 89, Goddard (1914) concluded that most criminals were feebleminded. There was of course an element of Lombrosian degeneracy in that notion. Much more testing during the 1920's together with revision of the concept of feeblemindedness as a result of the testing of recruits during World War I, led to the conclusion that the IQ's of criminals averaged about 15 to 20 points below those of non-criminals.

The law of 1899 that established the juvenile court was passed in Illinois and the first such court established was in Chicago (Binder, 1984). It was established on the premise that rehabilitation, not punishment, was the correct social response to the crimes of youths. Therefore, a natural development was the establishment of a clinic to work with the court on matters of diagnosis, treatment and research. And indeed that happened when the Chicago Juvenile Psychopathic Institute was founded in 1909 with William Healy, a psychiatrist, as its director (see Stevenson and Smith, 1934). His work at the Institute provided Healy the basic information on which his *The Individual Delinquent*, published in 1915, was based. In the book, he adopted a multi-factor approach to criminality, assuming that an analysis of the criminal behavior of an individual requires consideration of all possible components that affect the individual and determine that behavior. The mode of thought, thus, centered on individual factors in crime, not with general
social conditions. In the words of Halleck (1967:6), "This approach makes it possible to investigate the influence of a wide number of factors in a given crime, and since it is primarily concerned with causative factors in individual cases, it does not easily lend itself to the formulation of all-inclusive theories."

In 1913, Augusta Bronner, a psychologist, joined Healy at the Psychopathic Institute, starting a period of collaboration that extended to their deaths in the 1960's (see in particular Healy and Bronner, 1926, 1936). The multi-factor approach that was based on the analysis of individuals continued in their writings, depending upon case studies in Chicago as well as in Boston where they became Director and Assistant Director of the Judge Baker Foundation for young offenders.

**The Revival of Sociological Criminology**

In 1914, Robert Park joined the sociology department at the University of Chicago and started a program of research on the ecological distribution of various social characteristics and phenomena, including conformity and deviance. Park's approach had some of the features of the statistical method of Guerry and Guetelet, but depended most heavily, in guiding concepts and language, on the work of plant and animal ecologists. He (1952:118) regarded the city "as a functional unit in which the relations among individuals that compose it are determined: not merely by the city's physical structure, nor even by the formal regulations of a local government, but rather more by the direct and indirect interaction of individuals upon one another ... its component elements, institutions, and persons are so intimately bound up that the whole tends to assume the character of an organism."

Park's associates at Chicago, Shaw and McKay, used those concepts of human ecology in long-ranging studies of the patterning of juvenile delinquency in cities (see in particular Shaw and McKay, 1931,1942). Perhaps their major findings were, first, that the rates of delinquency varied considerably over regions of a city, and, second, that the rates remained constant despite changes in the ethnic or racial character of the people who successively lived in the regions. The sequence leading to crime was: deterioration in an urban area leads to social disorganization and the loss of control over children, street gangs form as a result of the lack of control and establish a tradition of criminal behavior, the tradition is culturally transmitted to succeeding generations, producing a continued high rate of delinquency.

Two other significant leaders in the revival of sociological criminology were Sutherland and Merton. Sutherland developed a theory of criminality based on learning in the context of interactive communication in intimate personal groups. It
had elements of Tarde's (1912) law of imitation but was derived most directly from Mead's symbolic interactionism (see Blumer's 1969 discussion of the theory). Merton (1957), on the other hand, revived Durkheim's anomie theory for twentieth century American society. For Merton, anomie, that is a breakdown in society's ability to restrain deviant behavior, results from strain in the lowest socioeconomic class between desires for the attainment of economic goals and the limited opportunities available for achieving them.

**Sociology Takes Charge**

Over the years following the initial penetration of mainstream criminology by people like Shaw, McKay, Merton, and Sutherland, sociology took charge almost completely. Other important factors aiding and abetting the process were Sellin (1938) who presented an early conflict theory in which crime results from a clash of conduct norms between cultural groups, Cohen (1955) who argued that gang delinquency stemmed from a separate culture (a subculture) that clashed with the dominant culture, Cloward and Ohlin (1960) who used Merton's notions of anomie and lack of opportunity to expand subcultural theory, Vold (1958) who used a sociological theory of group conflict in situations of political and social inequality to explain criminal behavior, Becker (1963) and Lemert (1967) who were key figures in establishing social reaction (or labeling) theory in criminology where deviance is assumed not to be inherent in a given act but defined by the social reaction to it, and Wolfgang and Ferracute (1967) who presented a theory of criminal violence based on the concept of a "subculture of violence" that is socially transmitted from generation to generation.

The extent of the domination of criminology by sociology is illustrated in the opening paragraph of a review by the sociologist Gibbs (1985:381) of the book on crime by Wilson and Herrenstein (1985):

American sociologists tend to take a proprietary interest in criminology and to think of the leading theories about crime as "sociological." Hence, Wilson and Herrenstein's tome ... may startle numerous sociologists, and those who suffer from high blood pressure should be cautious in reading it. Sociologists are accustomed to occasional forays by economists into criminology, but many will be unprepared for a flank attack by formidable scholars from political science (Wilson) and psychology (Herrenstein).

Snodgrass (1972:153) has described the process of shift from psychology (which includes psychiatry for him) as the dominant discipline to sociology as the dominant discipline in the following interesting way:
Shaw-McKay's research and theory were undertaken in response to the dominant psychological school, of which Healy was the chief spokesman. In the time period between Healy's publication of The Individual Delinquent in 1915, and Shaw-McKay's work of the late 1920's, the psychological school came to hold the same high esteem and entrenched position held by the bio-constitutional school when Healy first began his work. The psychological school was not overthrown, not in the way the bio-constitutional seems to have been. The psychological and sociological began to react against one another in a sort of dialectic parallel which lasted for many years. It was only in more recent years, with the advent of the subcultural theories of the 1950's and 1960's, that the sociological school came clearly to dominate the criminological scene.

There have indeed been repeated protests against the resulting state of affairs, but the effect has been as minimal as in other cases of pleas to be heard in a controlled culture. For example, Glueck (1959b:244) argued for a multi-factor approach in criminology, including individual as well as social factors, on the grounds that the purely social approach of sociologists "fails to take account of obvious differences in the somatic, temperamental and characterological make-up of individuals subjected to a superficially similar environment." In his plea for interdisciplinarity in the approach to understanding criminal behavior (1959a,b), he emphasizes his perception of the narrowness and intolerance of other viewpoints by sociologists and refers to Sutherland's theory, particularly, as (1959b:242) "general and puerile." More recently, Buickhuisen (1979:36) has pointed out "many sociological theories concerned with class, unemployment, and separation from parents would be more valuable if, when applying and interpreting them, criminologists gave some consideration to views derived from other disciplines such as psychology, pedagogy, and cultural anthropology." Finally, Wilson (1985:50) has objected to the narrowness of disciplinary domination in criminology in the following terms, "the criminologist, concerned with causal explanations and part of a discipline – sociology – that assumes that social processes determine behavior, has operated largely within an intellectual framework that makes it difficult or impossible to develop reasonable policy alternatives..."

There are probably two questions that should be answered to round out the picture presented. First how does one explain the process whereby sociology took control of criminology? And second, is sociology more domineering and intolerant (more ethnocentric in Campbell's, 1969, terminology) in the domain of criminology than are other disciplines in the domains they control? Unfortunately, neither question can be answered satisfactorily here due to the major effort that the
task would entail and the limited aims of this presentation. But a few hints at answers will be provided.

Turning to the first question, a substantial contributing factor to the turn toward a preference for sociological explanations of criminology was probably a firm distaste for the Lombrosian position of criminality as a component of degenerativeness, and a partial generalization of that distaste to theoretical individualism. Radzinowicz (1966:39) explains why Lombrosian bio-constitutional theory was supported in the Europe of his time in the following manner, "It served the interests and relieved the conscience of those at the top to look upon the dangerous classes as an independent category, detached from the prevailing social conditions. They were portrayed as a race apart, morally depraved and vicious...." In contrast, the United States during the era starting in the 1930's was developing a social consciousness and concern for the underdog (see, for example, Binder, 1984, for an articulation of that position). The country, therefore, was likely to have an effort like the New Deal and several commissions to determine the social causes of criminal behavior, and to regard as repugnant the notion that criminals, most particularly young criminals, were degenerate, or even defective.

A similar argument may be found in the presentation of Snodgrass (1972:19,20), although he reflects the American ethos from the perspective of the formulators of the theories:

The sociologists' theory was founded on the philosophy that the U.S., on the whole, was a democratic and egalitarian republic... All men were not equal, but the inequality arose from minor faults in proximity to the individual. The causes of crime, therefore, had to lie not necessarily within the individual and of course not in the social order, but in the imperfections which surrounded him. The theories turned therefore from the head of the individual to his back and shoulder, to the immediate conditions which weighed on him and pushed him around.

Now the second question: Is sociology unusually possessive of its fief, criminology, and particularly intolerant of incursions of other disciplines? It does seem so, although the evidence to support that conjecture is admittedly mostly anecdotal. Before turning to consideration of sociological-criminology specifically, however, a few general comments about the disciplinary biases of sociology might be in order. First, Campbell (1969:38), in his discussion of disciplinary ethnocentrism, points to sociology in the following way, "Philosophy and sociological departments have frequently maintained internal solidarity by teaching about the wrongness of behavioristic psychology." Whether it is to maintain internal solidarity or not, an excellent example of the broad condemnation of non-
sociological theories (far beyond those in behavioristic psychology) by a sociologist-criminologist may be found in Dinitz (1978). Second, one finds such statements in the literature as Comte "disliked psychological explanations" (Mannheim, 1972:27), "Psychology ... is given no place in Comte's system" (Mannheim, 1972:10), "every time that a social phenomenon is directly explained by a psychological phenomenon, we may be sure that the explanation is false" (Durkheim, 1964:104), "to treat the gang member as an isolated person, to compute his intelligence quotient, to call him psychopathic is to leave the full causation of his conduct untouched" (Young, 1927:51), and Sutherland, Shaw and McKay "distrusted psychology" (Snodgrass, 1972:19). Finally, a pejorative word one occasionally finds in the sociological literature is "psychologizing," used in derogation of another sociologist's use of explanatory constructs involving individual differences in place of or in addition to those based on social forces.

The general animosity among sociologists toward psychology and other disciplines that use individual differences extensively in their theories (like medicine and psychiatry) is dramatically illustrated in the interaction between theories based on intelligence and central criminology. While Goddard's more grandiose claims were not sustained in later studies, a review of the literature by Thomas and Thomas in 1928 brought the conclusion that there were indeed important differences between delinquents and non-delinquents in intelligence. But in 1931, Sutherland started a pattern of sociological criticism of mental testing and mental testers that led to a state of affairs where Hirschi and Hindelang (1977:580) could say, "If we follow the fate of IQ through mainstream criminology, we discover that its day was very brief." The brevity resulted from the abrupt emergence, during the 1920's, of sociology to preeminence in criminology. In the words of Hirschi and Hindelang (1977:580):

the medical profession seized power in criminology before the end of the nineteenth century and still maintained a preeminent position in the early days of intelligence testing...A short time later, however, criminology had become a subfield of sociology. Given this shift in disciplinary dominance, an equivalent paradigm shift is now pretty much accepted as logical necessity, "intelligence" was a central element of the "old" paradigm. It just had to go. And go it did.

Parenthetically, it is of interest to note that an attempt by Hirschi and Hindelang (1977) to elevate the status of IQ as an important explanatory construct in the delinquency theory of sociologists was a dismal failure. A vehement reaction by Menard and Morse (1984:1375) argued that, since IQ (like other individual characteristics) is linked to delinquency only as a result of specific institutional responses to it, "the IQ-delinquency hypothesis adds nothing" to delinquency
theory in sociology. Evidence of the general cool reception of the position of Hirschi and Hindelang may be found in the introductory text to juvenile delinquency by Empey (1982) that was referred to above. While sociological theories of delinquency are discussed in seven chapters, covering over 150 pages, neither "intelligence" nor "IQ" is given in the subject index.

A parallel phenomenon occurred in the area of personality testing after Schuessler and Cressey (1950) concluded, on the basis of a review of 113 studies that used such psychological tests as the Rorschach and the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory, that there was no direct link between delinquency and personality traits. Tennenbaum (1977:228) summarized those results and subsequent ones as follows: "Essentially, the data do not reveal any significant differences between criminal and noncriminal psychology because most results are based on tautological argument." Finally, in his very popular book Radical Non-intervention, Schur (1973) damned psychological theories, modes of psychological assessment, and psychological treatment methods, particularly behavior modification. To illustrate this attitude, after a listing of psychological case studies, he states (1973:38), "That dismaying compilation accurately depicts the vagueness of psychological thinking on delinquency."

Perhaps the above picture can be best summed up by the observations of Hirschi and Hindelang (1977:571):

From the beginning, the thrust of sociological theory has been to deny the relevance of individual differences to an explanation of delinquency, and the thrust of sociological criticism has been to discount research findings to the contrary. "Devastating" reviews of the research literature typically meet with uncritical acceptance or even applause, and new theories and "new criminologies" are constructed in a research vacuum, a vacuum that may itself claim research support.

A major source of this stance toward individual differences is the notion widely held in the field of deviance that "kinds of people" theories are non- or even anti-sociological. Most of the major theorists in the area (Sutherland, Merton, Cohen, Becker) have more or less explicitly argued this point...

In summary, then, sociologists, particularly those who consider themselves criminologists, seem more intolerant of other perspectives than is normally expected of disciplinarians. There is particular fervor among them in the denunciation of statements of empirical relationship and theories that are based on, or even use, constructs of individual differences. Perhaps that results from the
history of clashes and shifting dominance positions in criminology between sociology, on the one hand, and psychology and psychiatry, on the other, perhaps the reasons are more dynamic. But it is abundantly clear that a field is a long way from interdisciplinarity when the predominant individuals in that field reject other positions so fervidly.

CONCLUDING STATEMENT

Clearly, there currently are other disciplinary voices in criminology despite the dominance of the field by sociology – as was emphasized in the opening paragraphs above. Moreover, there are sociologists in criminology, as for example Jeffery and Hirschi, who either actively espouse interdisciplinarity or effectively incorporate the perspectives of other disciplines into their theories and research agenda. But the prevailing attitudes are as depicted above and reflected in the comment by Gibbs to the effect that sociologists may be tolerant of "occasional forays" by other disciplines but may have cardiac arrest if the foray turned into something serious. If one has that level of acceptance of the viewpoints of other disciplines, one is indeed a long way from Klein's (1986) expectations for an interdisciplinarity where words like "convergence" and "synthesis" are appropriate.

One might have expected more when the American Society of Criminology (ASC) was founded in 1941, as an association independent of the American Sociological Association (ASA). But what has happened is that sociological criminology has essentially shifted from divisional status in the ASA to thorough domination of the ASC. To illustrate, the inside cover of ASC's Membership Directory, 1985-1986 (the latest available at the time of writing this article) lists Executive Board Members and Executive Counselors. The listed President, Past President, Executive Secretary, and Editor of the ASC journal, Criminology (the "Interdisciplinary Journal"), are sociologists, as are five of the six Executive Counselors (the sixth is from the general area of criminal justice, not another discipline).

In more recent years, another association, the Academy of Criminal Justice Sciences (ACJS) was initiated in an attempt to provide a forum for the work of academic scholars in close association with that of practitioners of criminal justice. It has had some success in that effort at the cost of distinctly lower status vis-a-vis the ASC. The difference in status is reflected in the differential prestige of the officers of the two associations, the differential representation of major research universities in their membership roles, and, more subjectively, the differential level of presentations at their annual meetings and in their official journals. Of course, ACJS is the new association (by 22 years) and that may account for some of the
differences, but more important would seem to be the degree of practitioner-orientation in ACJS. If interdisciplinarity is ever to become a positive theme in criminology rather than mostly isolated rhetoric, however, one would guess that it will happen through ACJS.

Substantial numbers of its members are associated with departments of criminal justice, law enforcement, police science, or justice administration, rather than with departments of sociology, and those types of departments typically have a diverse array of disciplines represented on their faculties. The array may include sociologists, psychologists, lawyers, political scientists, and historians. There is, thus, not only an absence of the vehemence against other perspectives found in many purely sociological settings, but genuine opportunity for work toward a criminology based on the integration of contributions from several disciplines. Perhaps most important of all, students in those types of departments are not exposed to an unbalanced set of biases, and have correspondingly elevated freedoms in their directions of knowledge-acquisition and thought.

But, the accomplishment of interdisciplinarity in criminology by members of ACJS implies that a group that does not contain the leading scholars in a field, does not control the major avenues of publication, and does not have influence over the brightest students and future scholars (who, presumably, choose the major research universities for their graduate study), can have a revolutionary influence in the field. That is indeed not a process and outcome one would normally bet on.
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